Landmark Police Use of Force and Police Practices Cases

These landmark cases shape how police use of force, deadly force, tactical decision-making, municipal liability, and officer conduct are evaluated in litigation. This page provides a practical overview of key decisions frequently relevant to police practices expert analysis, use-of-force review, and civil rights litigation.

The core cases provide the framework for force standards. They do not answer every question, but they tell us what questions must be asked. For police agencies, the lesson is straightforward: policy, training, documentation, supervision, and tactical decision-making matter. For the public, the lesson is equally important: the legal standard for police force is not based on hindsight, outrage, or a single frozen frame. It is based on the totality of the circumstances, judged under the law. That standard may satisfy some people and frustrate others. But it is the standard courts continue to apply.

Graham v. Connor: The Starting Point

Any serious discussion of police use of force begins with Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).

In Graham, the U.S. Supreme Court held that claims of excessive force during an arrest, investigatory detention, or other seizure are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard. The key point is that the officer’s conduct is judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on scene, not with perfect hindsight after the facts have been dissected in court, in the media, or on social media.

Graham also gave us the familiar factors courts still use today: the severity of the crime, whether the suspect posed an immediate threat, and whether the suspect was actively resisting or attempting to flee.

For police agencies, Graham is foundational. For critics of police conduct, it is also often the point of attack because the standard gives considerable room for officers making fast decisions under uncertain conditions. Both things can be true.

Tennessee v. Garner: Deadly Force and Fleeing Suspects

Before Graham, the Supreme Court decided Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), one of the most important deadly-force cases in American policing.

Garner limited the old fleeing-felon rule. The Court held that deadly force may not be used merely because a suspect is fleeing. Instead, deadly force is constitutionally permissible only when it is necessary to prevent escape and the officer has probable cause to believe the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others.

Garner remains essential in officer-involved shooting cases, especially those involving foot pursuits, vehicle flight, armed suspects, and disputes over whether the suspect still posed a threat at the moment force was used.

Scott v. Harris, Plumhoff v. Rickard, and Mullenix v. Luna: Vehicles, Pursuits, and Deadly Risk

Vehicle cases occupy their own difficult corner of use-of-force law. Pursuits are dangerous, unpredictable, and often force officers to make decisions in compressed time.

Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007), upheld force used to end a dangerous high-speed pursuit. Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765 (2014), also involved deadly force during a vehicle pursuit. Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7 (2015), addressed qualified immunity after an officer fired at a fleeing vehicle from an overpass.

Together, these cases are frequently cited when suspects use vehicles in ways that endanger officers or the public. They also show how heavily courts weigh the danger created by fleeing drivers.

Kisela v. Hughes and Sheehan: Knives, Mental Health, and Split-Second Decisions

Two other cases often appear in police shooting discussions involving edged weapons, mental health crises, or rapidly unfolding confrontations.

Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. ___ (2018), involved an officer shooting a woman armed with a knife. The Court granted qualified immunity, emphasizing the difficulty of judging split-second decisions and the need for clearly established law before imposing personal liability.

City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600 (2015), involved officers confronting a mentally ill subject armed with a knife. The case is often discussed in relation to crisis response, tactical re-entry, disability issues, and qualified immunity.

These cases matter because many modern police shootings involve mental illness, edged weapons, or both. The legal question is not simply whether a better tactic might have existed. The question is whether the officer’s use of force was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances.

County of Los Angeles v. Mendez: No Automatic Liability for “Provocation”

In County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 581 U.S. 420 (2017), the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s “provocation rule.”

Before Mendez, the Ninth Circuit had allowed liability in some cases where officers committed a separate constitutional violation that allegedly provoked a later use of force, even if the final use of force was reasonable when viewed on its own. The Court rejected that approach.

Mendez is important because plaintiffs often argue that poor tactics, bad entries, or flawed planning caused the eventual shooting. Mendez does not make pre-shooting conduct irrelevant, especially under state negligence law, but it does limit how federal Fourth Amendment liability is analyzed.

Barnes v. Felix: The New “Totality of Circumstances” Reminder

The newer case to watch is Barnes v. Felix, 605 U.S. ___ (2025).

In Barnes, the Court rejected the Fifth Circuit’s narrow “moment-of-threat” approach. That rule had focused the analysis almost entirely on the instant the officer fired. The Court made clear that courts must consider the broader totality of the circumstances, not just the final seconds before the shooting.

This does not mean every tactical mistake becomes a constitutional violation. It does mean courts cannot put on “chronological blinders” and ignore relevant facts leading up to the use of deadly force. Barnes will likely become a major case in police-shooting litigation, training, expert reports, and internal reviews.

Hayes v. County of San Diego: California’s Broader Negligence Lens

For California cases, Hayes v. County of San Diego, 57 Cal. 4th 622 (2013), is critical.

Hayes held that under California negligence law, pre-shooting tactical decisions may be considered as part of the totality of circumstances. That makes California civil liability analysis different from a narrow federal Fourth Amendment analysis.

This is one reason a police shooting can look defensible under federal constitutional law but still face serious exposure under California negligence standards. For California officers, trainers, investigators, and risk managers, Hayes cannot be ignored.

Monell and City of Canton: When the Agency Becomes the Target

Not every police civil rights case is only about the individual officer. Sometimes the real target is the agency.

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), established that local governments can be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but not simply because they employed the officer. The plaintiff must show that a policy, custom, practice, or decision by a final policymaker caused the constitutional violation.

City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), added the failure-to-train theory. But the standard is high. A plaintiff must generally show deliberate indifference, not just imperfect training or a bad outcome.

These cases are central when lawsuits claim that a police department failed to train, supervise, discipline, or correct known problems.

For case-specific review or expert consultation, contact West Coast Police Integrity Advisors